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ABSTRACT
Throughoutthe post—war period, U.S. and Canadian unemployent rates
moved in tandem, but this historical link apparently ended in 1982.
During the past three years, Canadian unemployment rates have been some
three percentage points higher than their U.S. analogues, and this gap
shows no sign of diminishing. This paper is an empirical evaluation of
a variety of explanations for this new unemployment gap.
We first show that the demographic and industrial composition of
the two countries is remarkably similar, so that no simple mechanical
hypothesis explain the basic puzzle. It is also evident that the
increase in Canadian unemployment relative to U.S. unemployment cannot
be fully attributed to output movements. We find that the gap between
actual and predicted Canadian output, based on U.S. output, has fallen
dramatically since 1982 while the unemployment gap has widened. We also
find that unemployment in Canada was 2 to 3 percentage points higher in
1983 and 1984 than predicted by Canadian output.
We have investigated a variety of hypotheses to explain the slow
growth of employment in Canada after 1982. These hypotheses attribute
the slow growth of employment to rigidities in the labor market that
raise employers' costs and restrict the flow of workers between
sectors. The evidence does not support the notion that the growth in
relative unemployment in Canada is due to differences in the regulation
of the labor market in the two countries. Minimum wage laws and
unemployment benefits are fairly similar in Canada and the U.S. ,arid
neither has changed relative to the other in the last decade.
Unionization rates have increased in Canada relative to US. since
1970. Most of this divergence occured before 1980. however, and does
not seem to have created an unemployment gap prior to 1980. Finally,
the hypothesis that differential real wage rates are a major determinant
of relative employment in the U.S. and Canada is soundly rejected by the
data. Real wage rates have been essentially uncorrelated with employ-
ment movements within each country and between the two countries.
Orley Ashenfelter David Card
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Princeton University Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544 Princeton, NJ08544
(609) 452—4041 (609) 452—4045I. Introduction
At the sane time that unemployment has disappeared from public
policy discussions in the U.S., it has become the major focus of
discussion in Europe and elsewhere. It is not hard to explain the dif-
ference in public interest. European unemployment rates are at post—war
highs and seem to be stuck at current levels. The U.S. unemployment
rate is high by post—war standards, but it has declined considerably in
the last four years to the point where there is now clear evidence of
labor shortages in some parts of the country
Even more remarkable than the comparison of recent U.S. and
European experiences is the comparison of recent U.S. and Canadian
experiences. Throughout the post—war period, U.S. and Canadian
unemployment rates moved in tandem. Figure 1 displays this relationship
graphically by plotting the Canadian unemployment rate on the vertical
axis against the U.S. rate on the horizontal axis.' The historical link
between unemployment rates in the two countries apparently ended in
1982. During the past three years, Canadian unemployment rates have
been some three percentage points higher than their U.S. analogues, and
this gap shows no sign of diminishing.2
A variety of explanations has been offered for the disparity bet-
ween U.S. and European economic performance in the pastdecade.3 Many
of these explanations revolve around rigidities in the labor market
attributable to government intervention or other institutional
features.4 It seems apparent that simple structural explanations for
the divergence between U.S. and European labor market performance ought






























indeed we have heard many of the same explanations offered. Our purpose
in this paper is to examine the relationship between U.S. and Canadian
unemployment for the light it sheds on any of these explanations.
From a practical viewpoint, a comparison of U.S. and Canadian labor
market indicators is relatively straightforward, since both countries use
the smne methods to measure these indicators.5 A direct comparison of
U.S. and European indicators, on the other hand, is complicated by dif-
ferences in survey instruments and even in the underlying concept of
unemployment.6
Our goal Is to explore the data for the light they shed on a series
of hypotheses that attribute the divergence In unemployment rates to
structural rigidities in the labor market. Before examining these
hypotheses in detail, however, we examine the extent to which the
unemployment gap between Canada and U.S. is either a secular phenomenon,
or a result of differential business cycle movements in the two
countries. As Figure 1 suggests, we find no evidence of an unemployment
gap prior to 1981. Furthermore, the unemployment gap in 1983 and 1984
is not easily explained by movements in relative output during the
period. While Canadian output recovered from the 1982 recession at a
rate consistent with historical patterns, Canadian employment lagged far
behind, opening up an employment gap that in 1983 and 1984 explained
most of the difference in unemployment rates between Canada and U.S.
This unprecedented increase in productivity is remarkably similar
to employment and output changes observed in many European countries
during the last decade.7 In the following section of the paper, we—3--
explore primarily mechanical explanations for the shortfall of Canadian
employment growth. We first explore the extent to which the divergence
in unemployment rates between the U.S. and Canada may be attributed to
changes in the demographic composition of employment. We then consider
the possibility that differences in the industrial composition of the
two nations, coupled with underlying differences in industrial growth
rates, may explain differences in employment growth.
In the fourth section, we turn to arguments about structural rigi—
dity in the labor market. It is often argued that structural barriers
discourage employment growth: either by preventing the flow of workers
to new jobs; or by raising the costs of hiring new workers. Looking
first at direct government intervention in the labor market, we compare
the unemployment insurance and minimum wage laws in Canada and the U.S.
and how they have changed over the past twn decades. We then examine
the extent of unionization in the two countries and relative changes in
union coverage since 1960. The goal is to explore the possibility that
the labor market may have become more or less encumbered by non—
competitive barriers in either of these two countries.
In the fifth section of the paper, we examine the post—war history
of real wage movements in the U.S. and Canada, and the correlation bet-
ween relative employment growth and relative wage rates. In some analy-
ses unsustainable rates of real wage growth force down the profitability
of employment and lead to higher unemployment. Direct examination of
profits data is difficult, but it is straightforward to analyze the
course of labor costs between the U.S. and Canada and test this can——4—
didate explanation for the divergence in employment rates.
The conclusionsfrom our structural analysis of the U.S. and
Canadian labor markets are unenlightening. We find no evidence that
minimum wage or unemployment insurance provisions have changed sharply in
Canada relative to the U.S.. In both countries, minimum wages have
declined recently relative to average hourly earnings. Canada and the
U.S. increased the generosity of their unemployment insurance plans in
the early 1970's, and have both recently takenstepsto reduce
unemployment benefits (broadly defined). The only structural aspect of
the labor market that has changed substantially in Canada relative to the
U.S. is the extent of unionization. This change has occurred gradually
over the past 15 years, however, with relatively little change since
1980.
Our investigation of wage behavior is similarly unenlightening.
Historically, relative wage growth and relative employment growth bet-
ween Canada and U.S. have been positively correlated. The short run
relationship between wages and employment in each country is likewise
inconsistent with the hypothesis that wage increases prevent employment
growth.In any case, however, wages in Canada relative to their U.S.
counterparts have fallen dramatically since the mid—1970's with the
depreciation of the Canadian exchange rate. We have been singularly
unsuccessful in documenting structural differences in the U.S. and
Canadian labor markets that can explain the recent divergence in
unemployment rates between the two countries.—5—
II. An Analysis of Recent Movements in Unemployment
Table 1 presents some basic time series data on the U.S. and
Canadian labor markets.8 At this broad level, the labor markets of the
two countries are very similar, both in terms of labor force par-
ticipation rates and unemployment rates. Labor force participation
rates were lower in Canada in the 1950's but caught up to U.S. rates by
1975. In the late 1970's, Canadian unemployment rates were slightly
higher than those in the U.S. In 1980 and 1981, however, unemployment
rates were about equal in the U.S. and Canada.
Our analysis is motivated by the sharply higher unemployment rates
in Canada after 1982. Table 2 presents a simple regression analysis of
the problem. In column (1), we present the least squares regression of
the Canadian unemployment rate on the U.S. rate, using data from 1955 to
1981. Over this period Canadian unemployment rates moved more or less
point—for—point with U.S. rates. An examination of the data in Figure 1
suggests that Canadian unemployment rates typically responded to changes
in U.S. rates with a lag. In column (2) of Table 2, we include lagged
Canadian unemployment as an additona1 explanatory variable. The fit of
this simple equation is remarkably good. Typically, a one point
increase in U.S. unemployment rates brings about a one—half point
Lncrease in Canadian rates within the year, and a .9 point increase
within three years. Column (3) shows that, allowing for this partial
adjustment mechanism, there is only a negligible upward trend in
Canadian unemployment rates relative to U.S. rates prior to 1982.
Column (4) of the Table extends the regression in column (1) to theTable 1










(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1954 54.5 5567 5334 4.2 58.8 63692 60119 5.6
1955 54.5 5682 5457 4.0 59.3 64991 62156 4.4
1956 55.1 5863 5682 3.1 60.0 66542 63799 4.1
1957 55.6 6010 5820 4.3 59.6 66951 64074 4.3
1958 55.5 6205 5804 6.5 59.5 67674 63044 6.8
1959 55.4 6315 5971 5.5 59.3 68352 64623 5.5
1960 55.8 6485 6068 6.4 59.4 69643 65767 5.5
1961 56.2 6568 6138 6.6 59.3 70439 65733 6.7
1962 55.9 6663 6301 5.5 58.8 70611 66695 5.5
1963 55.9 6797 6452 5.1 58.7 71809 67755 5.6
1964 56.2 6989 6688 4.3 58.7 73077 69299 5.2
1965 56.5 7202 6943 3.6 58.9 74433 71079 4.5
1966 57.3 7493 7242 3.4 59.2 75749 72884 3.8
1967 57.6 7747 7451 3.8 59.6 77345 74372 3.8
1968 57.6 7951 7593 4.5 59.6 78707 75908 3.6
1969 57.9 8194 7831 4.4 60.1 80706 77875 3.5
1970 57.8 8395 7919 5.7 60.4 82800 78672 4.9
1971 58.1 8639 8103 6.2 60.2 84377 79352 5.9
1972 58.6 8897 8344 6.2 60.4 87019 82139 5.6
1973 59.7 9276 8761 5.5 60.8 89410 85051 4.9
1974 60.5 9639 9125 5.3 61.3 91967 86789 5.6
1975 61.1 9974 9284 6.9 61.2 93788 85841 8.5
1976 61.1 10203 9477 7.1 61.6 96152 88751 7.7
1977 61.6 10501 9651 8.1 62.3 98981 92015 7.1
1978 62.7 10895 9987 8.3 63.2 102234 96048 6.1
1979 63.4 11231 10395 7.4 63.7 104960 98824 5.8
1980 64.1 11573 10708 7.5 63.8 106974 99303 7.1
.1981 64.8 11904 11006 7.6 63.9 108668 100394 7.6
1982 64.1 11958 10644 11.0 64.0 110238 99525 9.7
1983 64.4 12182 10734 11.9 64.0 111515 100823 9.6
1984 64.8 12400 11000 11.3 64.4 113521 104999 7.5
Note: Labor force, employment and unemployment data pertain to the civilian non—institutional population:
15 and over in Canada; 16 and over in the United States. Canadian data for 1954—1965 are adjusted
for comparability with the revised Canadian Labor Force Survey. U.S. data represent annual averages
of seasonally adjusted nnth1y data from Citibase. Canadian Data is taken from Statistics Canada,
Historical Labor Force Statistics, 1974 and 1983 editions.Table 2
Relationship Between Annual Canadian and U.S. Unemployment Rates:
l955l984'
Dependent Variable:
Canadian Unemployment Rate in Percent
1955—1981 1955—1984
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Constant .520.00 —.09 .82 —1.17 —.05
(.62)
———(.53) (.71)(.48)(.53)
2. U.S. Unemployment .93 .51 .52 .87 .66 .55
Rate (.13)(.11)(.12) (.13)(.11)(.10)
3. Linear Trend .03 .03
(.02) (.02)
4. Lagged Canadian ——— .51 .52 .59 .40
UnemploymentRate (.11) (.12) (.09) (.10)
5. Post—1981 2.76 ———1.57
Intercept Shift (.68) (.51)
6.Standard Error .86 .63 .62 .88 .70 .58
Note: 110LS Standard errors reported. Equations without lagged dependent
variable exhibit strongresidual serial correlation.—6—
post—1982 period, with the addition of an intercept shift. The
regression indicates a 2.8 percent increase in Canadian unemployment
rates after 1981 that is unexplained by contemporaneous U.S. movements.
Allowing for partial adjustment, the conclusion is very similar.9 While
there is no indication of an emerging unemployment gap prior to 1981,
Canadian unemployment rates after 1982 are some 2.5 to 3 percent higher
than expected.
This simple analysis suggests that the post—1982 unemployment gap
is neither a secular phenomenon, nor a result of the timing relationship
between U.S. and Canadian unemployment. In order to pursue the timing
issue more formally, and also explore the contribution of output demand
to relative unemployment, we estimated a quarterly autoregressive fore-
casting model for the North American economy as a whole, taking as
jointly dependent variables the levels of real GNP (output), employment,
10 and unemployment in U.S. and Canada. In the data, this model has a
simple recursive structure in which the level of U.S. output is deter-
mined only by its own lagged values. This recursive structure makes it
relatively easy to form forecasts of U.S. employment and unemployment,
and Canadian output, employment, and unemployment, conditUmal on
starting values of each of these variables in 1981 and the sequence of
1 :i
realized U.S. output from 1981 to 1984. 1e can then decompose move-
ments in employment and unemployment in each country, and the
unemployment gap between Canada and the U.S., into components explained
by the movement of U.S. output during 1982—84, and unexplained com-
ponents. Since the "explained components" correspond to conditional—7—
expectations, the forecast errors should be close to zero if there has
been no structural change in the link between U.S. output and the other
variables. Large and systematic forecast errors indicate a breakdown in
this linkage.
The average annual prediction errors or "unexplained' components of
U.S. employment and unemployment, and Canadian output, employment, and
unemployment, are presented in Table 3. The unexplained components of
U.S. employment and unemployment are relatively small. In 1984, U.S.
unemployment was approximately one percentage point lower than
expected, conditional on actual U.S. output. About one—half of this
unexpected reduction in U.S. unemployment corresponded to extra
employment. The remainder is attributable to labor force morements.12
In Canada, on the other hand, the prediction errors are large and
systematic. Canadian real CNP was about 3.5 percent lower than expected
in 1982, controlling for the simultaneous contraction in U.S. output.
Historically, output shocks in the U.S. translate into contemporaneous
Canadian shocks with an elasticity of about one—half. In 1982, the
large external shock to Canadian output was reinforced by a domestic
shock of about the same order of magnitude.13
During 1983 and 1984, Canadian GNP continued to be lower than pre-
dicted on the basis of U.S. output, but the gap was shrinking. Based on
historical evidence, domestic shocks to Canadian output decay at a rate
of about 70 percent per year, holding constant U.S. output.14 The
post—1982 pattern of prediction errors for Canadian GNP is consistent
with a large domestic shock to GNP in 1982 and relatively small domesticTable 3
Prediction Errors for Canadian GNP and U.S. and
Canadian Employment and Unemployment,
Conditional on Actual U.S. GNP1







1982 .1 —.1 —3.4 —2.8 1.5
1983 .0 —.5 —2.2 —3.5 2.3
1984 .5 —1.2 —1.9 —3.9 2.7
NOTES: !"Predictions based on a fourth—order vector—autoregressive repre-
sentation of seasonally adjusted quarterly data. The model is
estimated with data from 1956 to 1981, and used to predict U.S.
employment and unemployment, and Canadian GNP, employment, and
unemployment for 1982—1984, conditional on 1981 starting values
aixi realized U.S. real GNP.
VExpressed as percentage points of unemployment. The
unemployment rate is defined as the difference between the
logaritlzns of the labor force and employment.—8—
shocks after that. There is no evidence of an increasing gap in
aggregate demand during 1983 and 1984.
In the Canadian labor market, however, prediction errors based on
realized U.S. CNP actually increased in magnitude during 1983 and 1984.
Employment was 2.8 percent less than predicted in 1982, 3.5 percent less
in 1983, and 3.9 percent less in 1984. Unemployment was higher than
predicted in all three years, although the loss in employment was larger
than the gain in unemployment in each case, reflecting an unpredicted
contraction of the Canadian labor force.
Table 4 summarizesthedecomposition of the Canadian—U.S.
unemployment gap into components attributable to movements in U.S. out-
put, and unexplained components. The Table makes clear that the
unemployment gap is not a result of predictable lags in the response of
the Canadian labor market to the U.S. business cycle.
The increasing magnitude of the Canadian employment and
unemployment prediction errors In Table 3, together with the declining
output prediction errors, suggest that an output—based explanation of
the unemployment gap is incomplete. To investigate the possibility of a
breakdown of the labor market—output relationship in Canada after 1982,
we performed a second simulation of Canadian employment and
unemployment, conditional on 1981 starting conditions and realized
Canadian GNP. Again, the predictions have the interpretation of con-
ditional expectations, given 1981 conditions and the entire sequence of
Canadian GNP25 The results of the simulations are summarized in Table
5. Conditional on output, Canadian employment was 1.8 percent less thanTable 4
Actual and Predicted Unemployment in
Canada and U.S.1'
(Annualaverages of quarterly values, In percent)
CanadianUnemployment MinusU.S. Unemployment2'1
Actual Predicted Residual
1982 1.5 —1.0 1.6
1983 2.5 —0.3 2.8
1984 4.2 0.3 3.9
NOTES: See notes to Table 3.Table 5
Prediction Errors for Canadian Employment and
Unemployment,Conditional on Actual CanadianGNP'







1983 —2 .4 2.2
1984 —3.3 3.4
NOTES: 1Predictions based on a fourth—order
vector—autoregressive representation of
seasonally adjusted quarterly data. The
model is estimated with data from 1956 to
1981, and used to predict employment and
unemployment conditional on 1981 starting
values and realized Canadian real GNP.
'Expressed as percentage points of
unemployment. The unemployment rate is
defined as the difference between the
logarithms of the labor force and
unemployment.—9—
expected in 1982, 2.4 percent less than expected in 1983, and 3.3 per-
cent less than expected in 1984. At the same time, unemployment was 1
percent higher than predicted in 1982, 2.2 percent higher in 1983, and
3.4 percent higher in 1984. The gap between employment growth and out-
put growth in Canada, and the corresponding increases in unemployment,
explain most of the unpredicted unemployment in Canada in Table 3 and
most of the unemployment gap between Canada and the U.S. in 1983 and
1984.
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that traditional
demand—side determinants of output and employment are not a major source
of the unemploynEnt gap between Canada and the U.S. Output was relati-
vely depressed in Canada in 1982, but has recovered predictably since
then. The unemployment gap, by comparison, widened in 1933 and 1984,
and seems likely to continue in 1985. In the remainder of the paper, we
examine conditions within the U.S. and Canadian labor markets that may
potentially explain the re1ati,e lack of employment growth in Canada.16
III. Demographic and Industrial Composition of Labor Markets
in Canada and U.S.
In this section we briefly summarize the demographic and industry
structures of the U.S. and Canadian labor markets. Table 6 presents the
shares of various age and sex groups in employment, unemployment and the
labor force in Canada and U.S. The Table also summarizes trends in
these shares during the last two decades, and the shares as of 1983.
The Table illustrates several points. First, the demographic
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is no evidence that Canadian unemployment rates are higher because of a
greater concentration of high—unemployment groups. Second, a disporpor—
tionate share of unemployment is concentrated among young workers in
both countries. Third, the pooi of employed workers has become relati-
vely older in Canada, The employment shares of 15 to 24 year olds were
below their long run averages in both countries in 1983, but by a wider
margin in Canada. While this may account for an upward trend in rela—
tive productivity in Canada, the changes are too small and too gradual
to explain the rapid increase in Canadian productivity after 1982.
Table 7 presents the industry composition of employment in Canada
and U.S. and compares five year employment growth rates in the two
countries by industry. Employment shares and growth rates by industry
are fairly similar in the two countries. At this level of aggregation,
there is no indication that Canadian employment is more heavily con-
centrated in slow—growth industries. The two right hand columns of the
Table give the aggregate employment growth rates in Canada and U.S. by
five year intervals. According to these data, Canadian growth rates
were about the same as TJ.S. rates from 1964 to 1969, and from 1979 to
1984, and were significantly higher than U.S. rates over the 10 year
period from 1969 to 1979. By an absolute comparison, then, Canadian
employment growth performed as well as or better than U.S. growth during
the past two decades. An absolute comparison is misleading, however,
because of the higher labor force growth rate in Canada. Equal
employment growth rates ir U.S. and Canada from 1979 to 1984 actually


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of employment grcMth in Canada in the 1980's is better interpreted as a
relative sFrtfall than an absolute one.
Our comparison of the demographic and industry structure of U.S.
and Canada leads us to an important conclusion: these structures are
remarkably similar. Consequently, the recent divergence between the
aggregate unemployment rates in the U.S. and Canada cannot be attri-
buted in any simple way to differences in demographic or industrial
structure. It follows that alternative, less mechanical explanations
for the divergence in unemployment rates are worth examining, and we
turn to those next.
IV. Labor Market Rigidities in Canada and U.S.
The similarity of the industrial and demographic structures of the
Canadian and U.S. labor markets deepens the puzzle of the recent
unemployment divergence between the two countries. One explanation for
the European/U.S. divergence is the widely discussed "Euroscierosis"
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, employment costs have
increased rapidly in Europe relative to the U.S. as a result of govern-
ment intervention in the labor market, social welfare policies, and
trade union policies. The effects of government and union regulat1ors
on hiring and firing decisions, and social policies that discourage
worker mobility, is said to be unemployment, resulting mainly from the
failure to absorb new labor market entrants.
This "regulatory rigidity" hypothesis is rarely spelled out in a
way that encourages empirical examination, and we re unaware of any
serious analysis of it. A simple hypothesis, however, is to associate—12—
sante level of structural or "regulatory" unemployment with the extent of
regulation in each country. If the "regulatory rigidity" hypothesis is
to explain the recent divergence of U.S. and Canadian unemployment
rates, two conditions must be met. First, measures of labor market
rigidity must be roughly similar in the U.S. and Canada throughout the
1960's and 1970's, in order to explain the similarity of unemployment in
the two countries during this period. Second, there must be a sharp
increase In "rigidity"in1981 or 1982.
Inwhat follows we select three straightforward measures of labor
market regulation forexamination. The first is an index of the minimum
wage rate, which is often alleged to operate as a barrier to the
employment of younger workers. The second is an indication of the
generosity of the unemployment insurance benefit system, which is often
alleged to cause workers to prolong their unemployment spells and to
cause explorers to initiate too many temporary layoffs. The third is
the extent of unionization of the labor force. We are aware that there
are many other rigidities in the labor market, including government and
non—government induced rigidities. Most of these are difficult to
quantify, however, and we leave our attempts to do so to further
research.
A.Minimum Wage Regulation
Table 8 indicates our measures of the statutory minimum wage rate
in the U.S. and Canada arid their levels since 1966. It is conventional
to use the ratio of the minimum wage to some aggregate wage rate as an
index of the effective minimum wage. We have selected average hourlyTable -
MinimumWage Rages,Coverage, andCoverage—Weighted













Minimum Nova Scotia Ontario Quebec
1966 1.08 1.00 .75 .41 1.25 .63 .30
1967 1.10 1.00 1.04 .43 1.25 .75 .35
1968 1.14 1.00 1.08 .43 1.40 .73 .35
1969 1.19 1.30 1.25 .46 1.60 .78 .41
1970 1.25 1.35 1.32 .45 1.60 .78 .39
1971 1.33 1.61 1.44 .46 1.60 .78 .36
1972 1.45 1.65 1.58 .46 1.60 .78 .34
1973 1.60 1.79 1.73 .46 1.60 .78 .32
1974 1.72 2.06 2.00 .47 1.87 .81 .36
1975 2.24 2.35 2.49 .48 2.10 .83 .37
1976 2.50 2.60 2.84 .47 2.30 .85 .39
1977 2.75 2.65 3.08 .45 2.30 .87 .37
1978 2.75 2.65 3.27 .43 2.65 .78 .35
1979 2.81 3.00 3.42 .42 2.90 .78 .35
1980 2.81 3.00 3.61 .40 3.10 .78 .34
1981 3.08 3.28 3.84 .38 3.35 .79 .34
1982 3.41 3.50 4.00 .36 3.35 .80 .32
1983 3.75 3.50 4.00 .35 3.35 .80 .31
1984 3.75 3.83 4.00 .35 3.35 .80 .30
Notes: 2jMinimum wage rates are taken from Labor Standards in Canada. The weighted relative mini—
mumwage represents a labor—force weighted average of relative minimum wage rates by pro-
vince and sex. For each province, the minimum wage is expressed as a fraction of average
hourly earnings in manufacturing. Minimum wages cover essentially all workers in all
provinces for the years Ui this table. Data for 1966—1970 was provided by R. Swidinsky.
Data for 1971—1984 represents author's calculations.
-"Actual minimum wage data is taken from the Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical
Supplement(1983). Coverage data is taken from Minimum Wage and Maximum Hours Standards
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (various Issues). Coverage data for 1982, 1983 and
1984 represent extrapolations.The coverage—weighted minlrm.imwage is the productofthe
coverageratio and the actual minimum, divided by average hourly earnings of non—
production workers in manufacturing, excluding overtime.—13—
earnings in manufacturing as a benchmark in each country. Minimum wages
vary by province in Canada, and we have used a labor force weighted
average of provincial relative minimum wage rates to form a national
index. In U.S. there is a uniform federal minimum wage, but coverage of
employment by minimum wage statutes is not universal. Traditionally,
the ratio of the minimum wage to average wages is multiplied by the
fraction of covered employment to obtain an effective minimum. It is
clear from the Table that as conventionally measured, the minimum wage
is typically higher in Canada than in the U.S. Without the coverage
adjustment, however, the relative minimums in the two countries are very
similar. Since 1980 the effective minimum has apparently declined in
both countries by about the same percentage amount. There is no
evidence of an increase in minimum wage regulation in Canada, either in
absolute terms or relative to the U.S.
B. Unemployment Benefits
Tables 9a and 9b provide a history of information on unemployment
benefits in U.S. and Canada since 1966. We present three measures of
the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits. The first of these
is the aggregate replacement rate, which measures the ratio of average
17
unemployment benefits to average earnings. We have calculated both a
gross replacement rate and a net replacement rate that adjusts for th
dLffering tax treatment of benefits in U.S. and Canada. There have been
some changes in relative replacement rates in the past two decades. In
1972, for example, revisions in the Unemployment Insurance Act in Canada




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the late 1970's gross and net replacement rates have remained more
or less constant in U.S. and Canada, although net rates are apparently
higher in U.S. than Canada.
A second measure of the generosity of the unemployment insurance
system is the average duration of benefit spells. During the 1970's,
benefit spells in both Canada and U.S. averaged about 15 weeks. The
duration of benefits is highly sensitive to economic coriditions, and
durations were longer in U.S. in 1975 and 1976, and longer in Canada in
1978 and 1979, reflecting the relative strengths of cyclical downturns
in the two countries. In 1980 and 1981, benefit spells were about of
equal length in U.S. and Canada.
In 1982 and 1983 benefit spells increased in both countries in
response to the downturn in economic activity. The increase was greater
in Canada, although the relative increase is roughly consistent with
historical patterns and the relative increase in unemployment rates in
Canada. Evidence on the duration of benefits does not suggest that the
Canadian unemployment insurance system is significantly more generous
from the U.S. system, or that there was a radical change in either
system in the 1980's.
A third measure of the generosity of unemployment insurance system
is the ratio of benefit recipients to the number of unemployed workers.
In contrast to the previous two measures, which characterize
unemployment benefits for those workers who actually receive benefits,
the ratio of recipients to unemployed workers summarizes the probability
of obtaining benefits, cridit1onal on becoming unemployed. For both—15—
Canada and U.S., we calculate the probability of receiving benefits by
dividing the average weekly number of benefit recipients by the average
weekly total of unemployed workers.
The last columns in Tables 9a and 9b present this number for Canada
and U.S., respectively. The comparison is quite remarkable. In spite
of the fact that coverage of employed workers by the unemployment
insurance system is approximately the same in U.S. and Canada, a given
level of unemployment generates about 3 times as many beneficiaries in
Canada as U.S. Some caution is required in interpreting these numbers,
since the U.S. beneficiary count only includes recipients of state
unemployment insurance benefits. The U.S. also operates unemployment
insurance schemes for veterans, federal workers and railroad workers
outside of the state system. In the 1970's, only 80 percent of average
weekly insured unemployment was covered by state programs. This number
increased to 90 percent in 1978 with revisions in U.S. law.
Nevertheless, eligibility criteria for unemployment insurance are
apparently stricter in U.S., with the result that the average ratio of
benefit recipients to unemployed workers is only about .3 in U.S., com-
pared with about .9 in Canada.
The time series variation in U.S. benefits per unemployed worker is
pro—cyclical, reflecting cyclical movements in the fraction of
unemployed workers who are eligible forbenefits.18 As noted by
Burtless (1983), the fraction of unemployed workecs in U.S. receiving
benefits has fallen in the last 5 years (controlling for business cycle
conditions). A similar decline in the ratio of beneficiaries to—16—
unemployed workers is apparent in Canada after the 1979 revision to the
unemployment insurance system there. The ratio increased in Canada in
1982, however, so that in 1984 the relative fraction of benefit reci-
pients to unemployed workers in Canada versus U.S. was as high as its
level In 1973.
The fact that unemployed workers are more likely to receive bene-
fits in Canada as compared to U.S. is an important difference between
the countries, and the only major difference ifl their unemployment
systems that we have found. This difference has existed for at least
the past 20 years, however, and seems incapable of explaining a recent
divergence in unemployment rates. It may nonetheless account for slower
adjustment to cyclical shocks in Canada than U.S. The evidence in the
second section of this paper, however, suggests that the recent
unemployment divergence is not an adjustment phenomenon.
C. Union Coverage
Table 10 presents time series information on the extent of union
coverage in the U.S. and Canada. The entries for 1950, 1960, 1964, and
1970 indicate relative stability in union coverage over that period,
with a small decline in U.S. coverage during the 1960's. Duringthe
1970's, however, union coverage ratios diverged rapidly, with union
coverage increasing some 4 or 5 percentage points in Canada and
decreasing by about the same amount in U.S. After 1980, information on
union coverage in TJ.S. ts irregular. Coverage measures from the Current
Population Survey, which became available in 1973, stopped in 1981, and
then resumed in 1984, are roughly in agreement with coverage ratiosTable 10
Union Membership as a Percentage of
Nonagricultural Employment: Canada and the U.S.
Union Membership as a Percentage
of Nonagricultural Payroll11
Measured from Union Records
Union Membership as a Percentage
of Wage and Salary Workers




1960 32.3 31.4 ———
1964 29.4 28.9 ———
1970 33.6 27.3 ———
1971 33.6 27.0 ———
1972 34.6 26.4 ———
1973 36.1 25.8 23.6
1974 35.8 25.8 23.2
1975 36.9 25.3 22.3
1976 37.3 24.7 23.4
1977 38.2 24.8 23.4
1978 39.0 23.6 22.7
1979 ——— —-— 23.8
1980 37.6 24.8-' 22.7
1981 37.4 ——— 21.2
1982 39.0 22.1.!
,
1983 40.0 ——— ———
1984 39.6 --- 19.1±1
Notes: !"Calculated as the ratio of estimated union membership to employment
on nonagricultural payrolls. The BLS discontinued its estimates cF
unionmembership in 1980. No Canadian estimate is available for 1979.
from Current Population Survey. Oata for 1973—1981 are
from Kokkelenberg and Sockell (1985). CPSdiscontinuedits union
membership questions during 1982 and 1983. The CPS survey includes
employee associations after 1976.
-"The 1982 figure for union membership in the U.S. was estimated by
the Bureau of National Affairs. The 1980 and 1982 membership
figures include membership in employee associations. The 1978 esti-
mate of union membership as percentage of nonagricultural employment
including association membership is 26.2 percent.
-'1Estimate from September 1984 CPS.—17--
estimated indirectly from union membership. By 1984, these data suggest
that union coverage was twice as high in Canada as U.S.19 While this
is an important difference between the two economies, the gap in union
coverage emerged in the early 1970's, and remained relatively constant
during the 1980's. We conclude that union membership rates by them-
selves cannot explain divergent unemployment rates after 1981.
Our conclusion from this analysis of minimum wage laws,
unemployment insurance provisions, and union coverage rates is straight-
forward. There is no direct evidence that changes in any of these
institutional features can explain the unemployment gap in Canada after
1981. Each of these features doubtless contributes to the level of
structural unemploynnt in each country. It is difficult to isolate a
dramatic change in any of these features that corresponds to the timing
of the unemployment gap.
V. Wage Rigidity and Employment
An alternative interpretation of the hypothesis linking the regula-
tion of labor markets to unemployment att:r[hites the causation to wage
rigidity. In this view, economic shocks that require wage decreases to
restore labor market equilibrium are prohibited from working their ay
through the economic system by labor market regulattous. According to
these notions, wage rigidity is the cause of unemployment and
unemploynnt has increased recerttly because of a sequence of economy—
wide shocks.
It is, of course, diFficult to test this hypothesis directly when
the economic shocks in question are not empirically identified, but two—18—
different aspects of this hypothesis are testable by using the corn—
parison of wage behavior in the U.S.andCanada.Ifit isrelative wage
rigiditythat has cause Canadian employment to grow more slowly than the
Canadian labor force relative to the U.S., then it seems that a com-
parison of the time—series path of wage behavior in the two countries is
called for. Alternatively, the relative wage rigidity explanation for
the divergence in unemployment presumes a causal relationship between an
exogenously deteniiined real wage and the employment level. We also sub-
ject this hypothesis to test in the two countries.
A. The Path of Real Wage Rates
Figure 2 portrays the history of the real wage rate in Canada rela-
tive to the U.S. since 1964. The wage series is the ratio of real
average hourly earnings in manufacturing in the two countries adjusted
for the real exchange rate.2° This series provides an indication of
what it costs in U.S. dollars to buy an hour of Canadian labor relative
to the cost of buying an hour of U.S. labor, and is perhaps a useful
measure of movements in relative labor costs to producers. As the
figure indicates, the cost of Canadian labor increased relative to the
cost of U.S. labor continuously until the mid_1970?s. After a sharp
fall in therelativecost of Canadian labor inthe1977—80 period, this
index remained relatively stable at around the value of 1.0 in sub-
sequent periods.
These data certainly do not provide any evidence that relative wage
rigidity is a major source of the divergence in Canadian and U.S.
































































































































































































































































the cost of Canadian labor relative to the cost of U.S. labor in the
post—1981 period. Second, the period from 1964 to 1974 that coincided
with higher rates of growth of employment in Canada than in the U.S.
also coincided with continued greater growth in Canadian real wage rates
than in the U.S. Thus, treating exogenous real wage growth as a causal
source of employment changes is entirely contradictory with the facts.
Although the current equality in U.S. and Canadian employment growth is
consistent with the current stabIlIty in the U.S./Canadian wage ratio,
the history of relative wage growih In the two countries in earlier
periods implies a positive, not a negatIve, relation between employment
growthand wage growth.
B. Effects of the RealWage onEmployment
Moredirect test of the role of real wages in determining
employment are con tainedin Table 11. Columns 1 and 4 of the table
indicate that employment may be well described as a (weekly) damped
second—order autoregressive process in both countries. Innovations in
Canadian employment display somewhat greater variability than in the
U.S. ,butthe rite ol change of employment is less persistent in Canada
than in the U.S.
Causality tests of employment by the real wage are reported in row
10 of the Table. There is marginal evidence of caitality from real wage
rates to employment in both U.S. and Canada. The sums of the coef-
ficients on the real wage variables in the regressions reported In
Table 11, however, indicate a positive, but effectively negligible,
long—run relationship between real wage rates and employment in both theTable 11
Autoregressive Representations of Manufacturing Employment:
Quarterly Data, Canada and U.S., 1962_1984h1
(standard error in parentheses)
Canadian Employment U.S.Employment Canada—U.S.a"



































































































——— ——— .04 ——— ——— .15 .12
NOTES: !'Seasonally adjusted data (all variables in logarithms). The wage rate represents
average hourly earnings of hourly—rated workers in Canada; production workers in
U.S. Regressions include a linear trend and quarterly dummy variables.
'Canadian and U.S. employment regressions are estimated jointly in a two—step
procedure. Correlation of the first stage residuals from Canadian and U.S.
equations is .40. The probability value of an F—test for equality of the U.S.
ar Canadian coefficients is .02.
1"Allvariables Indifference form. The probability value for an F—test that all
U.S. and Canadian variables enter with equal and opposite coefficients is .11.—20—
U.S.and Canada.2'In sum, we find no evidence that real wage rates
have been a factor in employment determination in either the U.S. or
Canada.
The last column of Table 11 provides a more direct test of whether
movements in the relative wage of Canadian versus U.S. workers have been
a causal factor determining relative employment movements in the two
countries. Here we simply difference the dynamic employment equations
in the two countries and compute the regression of relative employment
on relative real wage rates directly. This specification has the
attractive features that it differences out unobservable error com-
ponents in employment demand that are common to both countries. To the
extent that input prices and productivity shocks are similar between the
two countries, misspecification in the demand equation of one country or
the other is eliminated.
A test for coefficient equality between lagged U.S. and Canadian
variablesshows that these restrictions are not easily rejected.
Consequently, the differenced employment regression provides a powerful
test of the ro'e of relative wages in the determinatLonofrelative
employment.Theresults are the same aswhei :htest are performed for
eachcountry separately: there is no evidence that relative employment
and relative wage rates are negatively related.
VI. Conclusions
We began our investigation with the puzzle set out in 'Lgure 1:
Why has the unemployment rate in Canada increased so substantially rela-
tive to the unemployment rate in the U.S.? This question is all the—21—
more interesting because, as we have shown, the demographic and
industrial composition of the two economies are remarkably similar. It
seems that simple mechanical hypotheses cannot explain the basic puzzle.
It is also evident, however, that the increase in Canadian
unemployment relative to U.S. unemployment cannot be fully attributed to
output movements. We find that the gap between actual and predicted
Canadian output, based on U.S. output, has fallen dramatically since
1982 while the unemployment gap has widened. We also find that
unemployment in Canada was 2 to 3 percentage points higher in 1983 and
1984 than predicted by Canadian output. Some caution is nevertheless
required in interpreting post—1980 movements in employment and output in
Canada, since the magnitude of the 1982 contraction was unprecedented
22
in Canadian history.
We have investigated a variety of hypotheses to explain the slow
growth of employment in Canada after 1982. These hypotheses attribute
the slow growth of employment to rigidities in the labor market that
raise employers' costs and restrUt the flow of workers between
sectors. The evidence does not support the notion that the growth in
relative unemployment in Canada is due to differences in the regulation
of the labor market in the two countries. Minimum wage laws and
unemployment benefits are fairly similar in Canada and the U.S., and
neither has changed relative to the other in the last decade.
TJriionization rates have increased in Canada relative to U.S. since
1970. st of this divergence occured before 1980, however, and does
not seem to have created an unemployment gap prior to 1980.—22—
Finally, the hypothesis that differential real wage rates are a
major determinant of relative employment in the U.S. andCanada is
soundly rejected by the data. In the time—series data, real wage rates
have been essentially uncorrelated with employment movements within each
country and between the two countries.—23—
Footnotes
'For display purposes, we have superimposed the 45degreeline on
Figure1. The slope of a regression line (fit to pre—1982 data) is
.93.
2Basedon the first 7 months of data, 1985 unemployment rates in U.S.
and Canada are 7.2percentand 10.8 percent, respectively.
3For an academic analysis of these disparities, see Bruno (1985).
4The current situation stands in dramatic contrast to the 1950's and
1960's. In those years unemployment rates were significantly higher in
the U.S. than in Europe, and many economists apparently concluded that
the happy state of affairs in Europe was to be attributed to the more
interventionist government policies toward the labor market in Europe.
5Both countries use a rotating monthly household survey to measure
unemployment and employment, and use the same definition of
unemployment.The establishment surveys in each country, which measure
industryemployment and average hourly earnings, are also very similar.
6Soineofthese differences are discussed in Bureau of Labor
StatIstics (1978).
7See for example
8Consistent historical labor force statistics are not available for
Canada prior to 1966. We have adjusted 1954—1965 data for com-
parability with the revised labor force survey used after 1975.—24—
9Thesteady state impact of the intercept shift in column (6) is
2.6 percentage points.
10The model was estimated on seasonally adjusted data from 1956 to
1981 with four lags of each dependent variable, quarterly dummy
variables,a linear trend, and a trend shift variable taking effect in
first quarter 1974.
11As an Illustration, consider the problem of forming condItIonal
fore casts of a variable y ,giventhe actual values of a variable x
from t to t+j ,anda recursive forecasting model:
x =ax +u
s s—i s
y by51 ÷ cx51 + v
Let P denote the least squares projection operator, given the above
information. Then
=bP(y51) + cx_1 + P(v)
Since vis a forecast error, it is uncorrelated with x .Since
5 s—i
y does not Granger cause x ,vis also uncorrelated with
Therefore P(v) =ruwhere r is a population regression coef-
ficient. Using the forecast equation for x
=bP(y1) + rx + (c_ar)x51
The coefficients of this equation correspond to the coefficients of a
regression of y5 ovxand .Givena starting value for
y ,thisequation can be iterated forward in time to obtain the
required conditional forecasts.—25—
12For convenience, we have defined the unemployment rate as the dif-
ference in logarithms of the labor force and employment. By definition
then, the difference in employment and unemployment represents move-
ments in the labor force.
13There is reasonable evidence that the 1982monetary contraction
in Canada was larger than the U.S. contraction. Historical data on
money supplies, interest rates, and the components of GNP are recorded
in appendix Tables Al and A2.
141n annual data, the logarithm of Canadian real GNP(Y) has





where is the current innovation (forecast error) in U.S. GNP, and
represents an orthogonal domestic output shock.
'5This interpretation follows from the fact that Canadian
nniployment and unemployment do not appear to Granger—cause Canadian
output.
is worth reiterating that productivity per employed worker (as
measured by GNP and aggregate employment) actually increased sharply in
Canada relative to the U.S. after 1982. Thus "low productivity" is not
an explanation for relatively low employment growth in Canada. Hours
per worker in Canada have not changed substantially since 1981.—26—
117The ratio of average benefits to average earnings maydifferfrom
the average ratio of benefits to earnings if, for example, low wage
workers are more likely to receive benefits. Presumably, this bias is
about equal to U.S. and Canada.
'8One factor effecting the ratio of recipients to unemployed
workers is the duration of unemployment spells. Unemployment benefits
are denied for the first tio weeks of an unemployment spell in Canada,
and for an average of about the first week of unemployment in U.S. If
average duration increases, the fraction of potentially eligible
unemployed workers increases. This phenomenon cannot explain higher
beneficiary ratios in Canada as compared to U.S. over the past decade
since unemployment duration (as measured by the mean length of
interrupted spells) is about equal in the two countries, controlling
for cyclical conditions.
19An examination of unionization rates by Industry in the early
1980's suggests that union coverage rates are higher in Canada in most
industries, including manufacturing (46 percent in Canada versus 36 per-
cent in U.S.) and services and public administration (36 percent in
Canada versus 22 percent in U.S.).
20The real exchange rate is the ratio of Consumer Price Indexes,
multiplied by the nominal exchange rate.
21For the U.S., the sumoffour lagged real wage coefficients is
.08 (with a standard error of .07). For Canada, the sum of four lagged—27—
real wage coefficients is .0 (with a standard error of .04). The sums
of coefficients are essentially the same vhen four lagged values of con-
sumer prices are also included in the regressions. The finding that
short run age movements are only weakly correlated with employment move-
ments in the U.S. is well known: See Geary and Kennan (1982),
Ashenfelter and Card (1982), and Symons and Layard (1984).
22Annual employment and real GNPbothfill in 1982 for the first
time in history. By comparison, the 1982 recession in U.S. was the same
order of magnitude as the 1974—75 recession.—28—
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